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Introduction
An important strand of the literature on …scal externalities, tax competition and redistribution models the interaction between competing local jurisdictions in a game theoretical approach. We introduce a two-dimensional model of an economy with a new concept of restricted labor mobility and characterize conditions, under which tax policies of local jurisdictions do not a¤ect the e¢cient allocation of labor. Our results can serve as a guideline for e¢cient redistribution. But we abstract from strategic considerations and do not ask whether and how the scope for e¢cient taxation and redistribution is in fact exploited.
In contrast to previous models in the literature, which assumed either unrestricted labor mobility (e.g., Myers, 1990) , or labor mobility restricted by either a …xed cost of migration (e.g., Hercowitz and Pines, 1991, Myers and Papageorgiou, 1997) or a cost proportional to the migration distance (e.g., Mansoorian and Myers, 1993 , Hindriks, 1999 ,2001 , our model focuses on prohibitive impediments to mobility. We assume that the individual's quali…cation pro…le and her willingness to move determine a subset of …rms for which she may be employed. This subset de…nes the individual's e¤ective area of mobility. While we assume that the individual can costlessly move to the …rms in her area of mobility, she incurs an in…nite cost if she chooses employment outside this area. In contrast to the above literature, which typically describes labor mobility as an interregional phenomenon, mobility in our paper encompasses both interregional and intraregional mobility.
Our approach of modeling mobility can generate an e¢cient equilibrium with di¤erent marginal productivities across …rms, because mobility restrictions possibly prevent individuals from working for the …rm with the highest marginal productivity.
These productivity di¤erentials can allow for e¢cient taxation with tax instruments that vary across jurisdiction. Di¤erent tax rates across jurisdictions can be rationalized by the goal of income redistribution across di¤erent regions. In our model, local authorities levy lump-sum taxes on wages earned by workers in …rms located within the jurisdiction. Taxes can cause ine¢cient decentralized equilibria, since individuals decide to work for the …rm that pays the highest net wage within their respective mobility areas. However, e¢ciency requires that individuals work for the …rm with the highest marginal productivity (=gross wage) within their mobility areas. The main intuition for e¢cient taxation is that taxes can sometimes skim o¤ some of the di¤erences in marginal productivities without creating an incentive to individuals to move to another …rm.
For the case of two local authorities (either two countries or two regions), we show that tax rates are e¢cient if the tax di¤erential between the two countries is not higher than the minimum productivity di¤erential of "directly connected" …rms across the border. Two …rms are directly connected if there are workers whose area of mobility contains both …rms. This …nding can serve as a guideline for redistributive programs, for example between countries in the European Union (Regional Funds) or between regions in a country (e.g. the "Länder…nanzausgleich" in Germany). We discuss the applicability of our results and policy implications in the context of different principles of taxation (place-of-employment principle versus place-of-residence principle) and di¤erent forms of mobility (migration versus commuting). Furthermore, we give some insight into the distortion of the labor allocation that results from ine¢cient tax rates in the case where the two countries form an equal productivity area. Intuitively, one would think that the distortion of the labor allocation is restricted to a stripe along the border. We show that the distortion will a¤ect the whole economy.
Of a more theoretical nature is the comparable study for the case where the number of local tax instruments equals the number of …rms. We show that there always exist e¢cient tax rates, such that in the implied decentralized equilibrium net wages are the same across all …rms. This result constitutes an important benchmark:
While e¢cient equalization of net wages can most likely not be achieved in the case of only two jurisdictions, it can always be achieved if we re…ne the tax code to …rm-speci…c instruments.
An appealing feature of our model lies in its spatial dimension. We model the economy as a subset of the two-dimensional space of real numbers and assume that individuals are distributed across the economy according to some continuous distribution function. This generalizes the setup of Hindriks (1999 Hindriks ( , 2001 ) and Mansoorian and Myers (1993) , who assume a uniform distribution of the population over the unit interval forming their economic union, and of other models in the literature that do not include spatial dimensions at all. An obvious advantage of our two-dimensional approach is the straightforward translation of our results to the real world geographical situation.
The ongoing integration of markets and removal of legal restrictions implies greater mobility of labor. For example, the Treaty of Rome allows citizens of the European Union to seek employment in any member state. Studies by Gyourko and Tracy (1989) provide evidence that labor in the United States is very mobile and responsive to tax-related changes (see also Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996 , p.315-316 for more literature on related studies). On the other hand, Wildasin (2000) examines the degree of labor mobility in the European Union. He concludes that while labor mobility is in fact substantial, it is too low to be compatible with the assumption of unrestricted labor mobility. As extreme cases, our model can account for completely restricted mobility (if the mobility area of each individual consists of only one …rm) and free mobility (if each individual can work for all the …rms).
We believe that there are multiple explanations why de facto labor mobility is still far from unrestricted although de jure it is not. We can categorize them into pecuniary (direct migration cost and indirect costs, for example the loss of clientele or networks) and non-pecuniary (language and other quali…cation, culture, attachment to home) reasons. In our approach, we focus on what we believe to be prohibitive impediments to mobility, at least in the short run. For example, knowledge of the language in the country of employment can be expected to be a necessary prerequisite for most white-collar jobs. Cultural factors may also be interpreted as an impediment to international mobility. Speci…c professional quali…cation requirements exclude many individuals from working for certain …rms. The impediments lead to an e¤ective area of mobility, which at least in the short run can be viewed as exogenous. It turns out that our way of modeling mobility restrictions may lead to an equilibrium with discrete jumps in wages and productivities within one institutionally integrated area. We think that these discrete jumps do indeed exist, not only between countries, but also within one country, for example within Germany The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a spatial model of restricted labor mobility. In section 3, we characterize the e¢cient allocation of labor.
In section 4, we establish the relationship between an e¢cient allocation of labor and a decentralized equilibrium. In section 5.1 we introduce …rm-speci…c wage taxes to the model. We completely characterize the cases where tax di¤erentials do not lead to ine¢ciencies. In section 5.2. we look at the special case of a two-country model.
Instead of …rm speci…c wage taxes we now allow for only two di¤erent tax rates on wages, one for each country, and again we completely characterize the conditions under which tax di¤erentials do not lead to ine¢ciencies. When the two countries constitute an equal productivity area, we present additional insight into how tax di¤erentials distort the allocation of labor. In section 5.3. policy implications are discussed. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. All proofs are given in an appendix.
The Model
We consider an economy that is populated by individuals and …rms. The economy is assumed to be a connected subset U of the two-dimensional set of real numbers Firms: There are n …rms that are located within U. Their location is exogenously given. Each …rm produces the same homogeneous good using labor l as the only input factor. We denote the …rms by t = 1; :::; n. Firm t produces according to the production function F t (l) where
Mobility: To each …rm t we assign an open set K t ½ U , which we call the catchment area of …rm t. Its interpretation is the following. Individuals located in K t satisfy two properties: they are willing to work for …rm t (and would choose to work for …rm t if it pays a competitive wage) and …rm t is willing to hire them. Individuals located outside K t are either not willing to work for …rm t or …rm t is not willing to hire them (because they lack the quali…cation).
For simplicity we assume that U = [ n t=1 K t . We can think of the catchment areas as overlapping circles around the …rms' locations. But the model allows for more complicated patterns of mobility. For example, the catchment areas do not have to be connected sets.
Furthermore we assume that an individual can commute costlessly to a …rm if she belongs to the …rm's catchment area (but cannot work for the …rm at all if she does not belong to the …rm's catchment area).
Alternatively, we could assign to each individual the set of those …rms that would employ the individual and for which the individual is willing to work. These sets de…ne each individual's mobility restrictions. In our model we do not specify in more detail why individuals are not unrestrictedly mobile although there are no institutional barriers. We take it as an empirical fact that not all individuals are willing and quali…ed to move to any place in order to work. The justi…cation for restricted mobility may lie in pecuniary or non-pecuniary costs of migration.
Cultural or psychological reasons may keep people from working outside a certain range from home. Missing quali…cation or language skills may keep …rms from hiring certain individuals.
The representation of the …rms' catchment areas allows us to de…ne a partition of the union U as follows: let S be a nonempty subset of all …rms f1; :::; ng, ; 6 = S ½ f1; :::; ng. We de…ne
M S is the subset of U which consists of those individuals which can work for every …rm t 2 S but not for …rms t = 2 S. Note that all individuals in M S where S consists of only one element t must work for the …rm t and cannot work anywhere else.
We then have the following partition of U: U = _ [ S M S . To simplify notation we will often omit brackets for sets: e.g. M f1;2;3g is written as M 123 . Figure 1 gives an example with three …rms. In this …gure the economic union U is given by a rectangle.
Individuals that can only work in either …rm 1, 2, or 3 are indicated by M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 respectively. Individuals that can either work for …rms 1 or 2, 1 or 3, or 2 or 3 are represented by M 12 , M 13 , and M 23 respectively. Finally, individuals that can work in each of the three …rms are in the set M 123 .
We then de…ne A S := R M S µ(x)dx. A S is the mass of workers in M S , the size of the labor force in area M S . Because the variables A S are derived from the M S , which form a partition of the area U, the labor force is partitioned by the A S .
A model with unrestricted mobility of labor where every individual can work in every …rm is a special case of our model in which M S = ; 8S 6 = f1; :::; ng and M f1;:::;ng = U hold. On the other hand, complete immobility of individuals (each worker can only work for one …rm) corresponds to U = _ [ t M t (t = 1; :::; n).
If for two …rms s and t there exists a set S ½ f1; :::; ng such that s; t 2 S and A S > 0 then we say that the …rms are directly connected . In words, two …rms are directly connected if there exists a positive mass of workers whose area of mobility contains both …rms s and t.
E¢cient Allocation of Labor
In this section we will derive conditions for an e¢cient allocation of workers among the …rms. By an e¢cient allocation we mean an allocation, that maximizes total output in the economy, subject to the mobility restrictions of the individuals. We show below, that an e¢cient allocation is equivalent to an allocation, in whichgiven the allocation of the other individuals to …rms-each individual works for a …rm within her mobility area that has highest marginal productivity. Therefore, each individual maximizes her wage and thus her utility, subject to her mobility restrictions and taking as given the decisions of the other individuals.
A social planner's problem is to maximize output by allocating all individuals in U that can work for more than one …rm, i.e. for all sets S where S contains at least two elements she has to assign a …rm s 2 S to each of the individuals in M S .
To handle this problem, we introduce variables M t S and A t S for all nonempty subsets S ½ f1; :::; ng and for all t 2 S with the following meaning. We denote by M t S the subset of individuals in M S that work for …rm t. The variables M t S thus re…ne the partition of U induced by the M S . Whereas M S contains all the individuals that can potentially work for each of the …rms in S (but for no other …rms), the sets M t S consists of only those people in M S that actually work for …rm t 2 S. Furthermore,
is the measure of workers in M t S , i.e., the size of the labor force in M S that actually works for …rm t. By the de…nitions of A S and A t S the following relationship holds:
A S , the size of the labor force that can work for exactly the …rms in S is partitioned among the …rms in S.
To simplify notation, we introduce the following vector of variables: (A) := (A t S ) t2S S½f1;:::;ng;jSj¸2 . The aggregate output is given by the sum over the …rms' outputs. The argument in …rm t's production function is the measure of workers employed at this …rm. This measure is the sum of the measures A t S (mass of workers that the …rm employs from individuals in M S ) and A t (the mass of workers that can only work for this …rm).
Thus the aggregate output is:
The social planner's optimization problem ("Problem (P)") can then be formulated as follows: 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 8S ½ f1; :::; ng; jSj¸2 and 8t 2 S;
We will now present a …rst result that highlights the interplay between mobility restrictions in form of the catchment areas, technologies, and population distribution. The following lemma shows what constellations of marginal productivites are possible in an e¢cient allocation. Given a …xed distribution of the workforce and catchment areas for the …rms (and therefore shares A S ), it is showed that arbitrary positive marginal productivities in the n …rms (that is, any n positive numbers that stand for the marginal productivities of the …rms once the workforce is allocated to the …rms) are compatible with an e¢cient allocation of the workforce (A), if only one chooses appropriate production technologies for the …rms.
Lemma 1: Let there be n …rms with catchment areas K t (t = 1; :::; n)
and a distribution µ of the workforce. Then for n arbitrary positive numbers f 0 t (t = 1; :::; n) there exist technologies of the …rms [that is production functions F t (t = 1; :::; n)] such that in a solution to problem
The lemma proves in particular that in our model of restricted mobility, marginal productivities do not have to be all equal in an e¢cient allocation. Note that proposition 1 in the next chapter establishes that we can obtain each e¢cient allocation as a decentralized equilibrium. In the following discussion we can therefore interpret marginal productivities of an e¢cient allocation as wages. Let …rms s and t be directly connected and assume …rm s has higher marginal productivity. Pick an individual who lives on the border of the catchment area C of …rm s (we assume that C is open and thus the individual does not belong to C) and works for …rm t. He cannot work for …rms s because he is not included in C. However, any arbitrarily small neighborhood around the individual has a nonempty intersection with C. This means that arbitrarily close to the individual there exist other individuals being paid a higher wage or in other words, wage rates do not change continuously but may display discrete jumps. Because we think that these discrete jumps do in- In the unrestricted mobility literature, e¢ciency of an allocation implies equal marginal productivities across …rms. In contrast to this observation, lemma 1 proves that in our model only very little structure is imposed on e¢cient allocations a priori. This is done by demonstrating that for given catchment areas of the …rms and a distribution of the workforce, any n positive numbers can be realized as the marginal productivities (or wages, if wages are paid according to marginal productivities) of the …rms in an e¢cient allocation. However, our model does impose more structure on e¢cient allocations once more information on catchment areas, population distribution and production functions is available. We will illustrate this with the following simple remark which follows immediately from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Remark: Let s and t be two …rms and S ½ f1; :::; ng such that s; t 2 S: 
and from (5) we must have A t S = 0. The interpretation of the remark is as follows. For two …rms with a nonempty intersection of catchment areas it can be concluded that in an e¢cient allocation marginal productivities have to be equal if among the workers who can work for both …rms some workers actually work for the one and some workers for the other …rm (…rst statement). Productivity di¤erentials due to mobility restrictions can only be optimal if the less productive …rm employs no workers from the intersection of their catchment areas (second statement). Otherwise one could increase total output by letting some of the individuals in the less productive …rm work for the more productive …rm. This is interesting from an empirical point of view. If we observe productivity di¤erentials (or equivalently wage di¤erentials ) then we can conclude that mobility restrictions prevent the equalization of marginal productivities and therefore -as will be discussed later-di¤erent tax rates could be imposed without necessarily leading to ine¢ciency. Binding mobility restrictions are the key concept in this paper and we have to de…ne carefully what we mean by it in the context of our model. We give a formal de…nition and then motivate it: Note that negating the de…nition we get: No mobility restriction is binding if all …rms have the same marginal productivities and for all sets W ½ f1; :::; ng for which there exists a set S ½ f1; :::; ng which contains both elements of W and elements of CW and for which A S > 0; it holds that there exists a set S 0 ½ f1; :::; ng which contains both elements of W and elements of CW , for which A S 0 > 0 and A t S 0 > 0 for a …rm t in W:
One should think of binding mobility restrictions in an allocation as productivity di¤erentials between directly connected …rms (part a) of the de…nition). In an e¢-cient allocation without restrictions on labor mobility this situation cannot occur. However, with restricted mobility it can. For example, take the simple case of just two …rms s and t: Imagine in equilibrium …rm s employs all the workers that can work for both …rms but still has higher marginal productivity than …rm t. A reason for that to happen is that the mass of individuals that can work for …rm s only, is relatively small. Another reason could be a superior technology in …rm s: If mobility was unrestricted in this case, workers from …rm t would switch to …rm s until marginal productivities would be equalized.
Part b) of the de…nition is more delicate, in that it deals with e¢cient allocations arising under restricted mobility that would still be e¢cient if we allowed for free mobility. For simplicity, take again the example of the two …rms. In the notation of the de…nition we have W = ftg and S = fs; tg: Assume that again s employs all the workers that can work for both …rms but this time marginal productivities are equalized. If we looked at the same scenario under free mobility, nothing would change. Why then do we de…ne this situation as one of binding mobility restrictions?
The rationale for including b) in the de…nition of binding mobility is that any arbitrarily small upward change in the marginal productivity of …rm s (induced, for example, by applying a new technology) will lead to a situation where total output is strictly smaller than in the case of free mobility because we could increase output by shifting some workers from t to s. However, due to mobility restrictions this is impossible. The case of several …rms in part b) is to be understood in the same way:
All …rms have the same marginal productivities. There exists a set W of …rms that employs none of the individuals that can work for a …rm in the complement of W although some individuals who work for …rms in CW could also work for a …rm in W . The equilibrium is not going to be a¤ected by taking away mobility restrictions since marginal productivities of the …rms are already equalized. However, any arbitrarily small increase in marginal productivity of a …rm s = 2 W that is directly connected with a …rm in W or a negative shock to the marginal productivities of all the …rms in W will lead to di¤erent allocations under the two scenarios of restricted and unrestricted mobility. In the latter model, the relative increase in marginal productivity of the …rm s (or equivalently the negative relative shock to …rms in W ) leads individuals to move from …rms in W to s; in the former case this is impossible due to mobility restrictions.
In chapter 4 we will introduce the concept of a decentralized equilibrium. Individuals take wages as given and move to the …rm that pays the highest wage subject to their mobility restrictions. Thus, when it comes to the decentralized allocation what really matters are wages, which (in a more general setting introduced in chap- 
The Decentralized Equilibrium
A natural step is now to establish the relationship between the e¢cient allocation characterized by (2) -(5) and a decentralized solution. We assume a competitive economy. In this economy there are n + 1 markets, one for the consumption good and n for labor in the di¤erent …rms. Without loss of generality we can …x the price of the consumption good to be equal to 1. For our purposes it su¢ces to characterize the economy by the n wage rates of the …rms. The wage rate of a …rm equals its marginal productivity which in turn is determined by the size of the labor force working for this …rm. In a decentralized market equilibrium individuals act as wage takers and maximize wage income subject to their mobility restrictions. We end up with a result in the spirit of the two welfare theorems.
De…nition 2:
A decentralized equilibrium is an allocation of the workforce (A) = (A t S ) and a set of induced wages w 1 ; :::; w n (induced by the marginal productivities of the …rms) such that no individual i can reach a …rm with a strictly higher wage than i earns in the allocation (A).
Note that in the above de…nition and throughout the paper we say that a certain property holds for no individual, if whenever the property holds on a set K of individuals, it follows that R K µ(x)dx = 0. We say that a certain property holds for all individuals, if it holds on a set K of individuals for which R
We can now formulate the following important result: The …rst part of the proposition obviously carries over to the case of uniform (unionwide) lump sum taxes. Thus, proposition 1 constitutes an important benchmark when we introduce decentralized tax instruments.
Di¤erential Wage Taxation and the Scope for Redistribution
In this section we introduce lump-sum taxes on wages. We do not specify what the intended purpose of this tax is. What we have in mind however, is a redistributive tax used to generate a more equal income distribution across regions in a union.
Equalization of income levels requires di¤erences in net taxes. While tax di¤eren-tials necessarily induce ine¢ciencies in models of unrestricted mobility of labor, there can be scenarios in our model when di¤erent tax rates can be implemented without a¤ecting the e¢ciency properties of the economy. In sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter we will investigate and solve two scenarios: …rst, we will allow for a centralized, union-wide authority that can impose …rm-speci…c taxes T t (t = 1; :::; n) on labor, that are possibly di¤erent for all …rms. However, the nomer "…rm-speci…c taxes" should not necessarily be taken literally. What is important is the fact that the tax code is not restricted to a uniform-lump sum tax but can condition on smaller units (for example regions) within the union. The smallest observable units in our model are …rms. Under this assumption of …rm-speci…c taxes, we will completely characterize the cases in our model in which any tax di¤erential necessarily implies ine¢ciency, that is, the cases that are qualitatively equivalent to the results from the unrestricted mobility literature. The second scenario is more realistic and of higher empirical relevance: We will divide the union in two countries and restrict the number of available tax instruments to only two country-speci…c taxes on wage income.
Again, we present a complete characterization of the cases for which di¤ering tax rates do not lead to ine¢ciency and thereby answer the question when redistribution in a federation can be done without a¤ecting the e¢ciency of the economy. Finally, in section 5.3, we will apply the results to wage taxation in the European Union under the place-of-employment versus the place-of-residence principle.
An important assumption implicitly made throughout this chapter is that each …rm's catchment area K t , the set of workers a …rm can attract, is given exogenously.
In particular, it is independent of the tax rates. This assumption may seem to be questionable. If taxes become very high for some …rm t relative to the others, one might expect the catchment areas to change: workers who so far have not been willing or quali…ed to work for a …rm s (because, for example they did not speak the language of the country where s is located) may now reevaluate the …nancial advantage of working for …rm s versus the multiple drawbacks to quit …rm t that had been predominant so far. Some workers may then indeed decide to quit t and acquire the necessary skills to work for …rms s. There is at least two ways to face this critique. First, we could interpret the model as a short-term model. After the tax is imposed on a …rm workers will not quit immediately. Acquiring additional skills (a new language for example) will take some time. Second, we could interpret the mobility restrictions as real prohibitive impediments. Regardless of …nancial disadvantages individuals may, for example, not be willing to give up their cultural background.
Tax Di¤erentials and Ine¢ciencies
We have mentioned above that tax di¤erentials need not lead to ine¢ciencies in our model. Before we give a general characterization of when this can happen, we want to discuss a simple illustrative example:
Example: Let (A) be an e¢cient allocation. Let s 2 f1; :::; ng be a …rm. De…ne
t g where the minimum is taken over all …rms t that are directly connected with …rm s and assume T > 0. Then any tax T s levied on the wages of the workers of …rm s such that 0 · T s < T does not lead to ine¢ciency.
In the example we assumed that T > 0. This case can occur in our model due to binding mobility restrictions. The intuition of the result is simple. If there are islands of high productivity, then these islands can be taxed without creating incentives to change the workplace as long as the tax is smaller or equal to the marginal productivity di¤erence between this island and the neighbor with the next highest marginal productivity. It can be interpreted in favor of interregional transfer payments between regions with di¤erent standard of living, i.e. between rich and poor areas, that are intensively discussed in countries like Germany ("Länder…nanzausgleich") or in the European Union (Regional Funds).
We now tackle the general problem. Let us assume that a centralized authority can impose …rm-speci…c taxes T t (t = 1; :::; n). We are interested in describing all the cases in this setup in which redistribution always implies ine¢ciency. The remaining cases are then the ones where redistribution can be achieved without a¤ecting e¢-ciency. We thus build a bridge from our model of restricted labor mobility to models with free labor mobility (where di¤erential taxes always imply ine¢ciency). To do so, the following de…nition will prove helpful: De…nition 3: Let (A) = (A t S ) be an e¢cient allocation. If there is no binding mobility restrictions in (A) and any two …rms s; t 2 f1; ::; ng are linked by a chain of directly connected …rms (that means for all …rms s; t 9n = n(s; t) 9k 1 ; :::; k n such that k 1 = s; k n = t and 8r = 1; :::; n ¡ 1 the …rms k r and k r+1 are directly connected) then we will call the economy an equal productivity area or region.
In particular, if the economy constitutes a region, marginal productivities throughout all the …rms will be equal. Therefore, intuitively, one should think of a region as a connected area of equal standard of living. The concept of a region sheds light on the interpretation of a homogeneous good in the case of a spatial model. If one takes the Arrow-Debreu de…nition of a good literally, individuals living at di¤erent places supply di¤erent factors because they can be spatially distinguished. This de…nition would be inexpedient because it would lead to a total fragmentation of markets and it would be unclear how this concept could be related to the notion of homogeneous labor used in non-spatial models of markets. With the above de…nition we can de…ne labor as being homogeneous if it is employed within a region. Thus, it is not the locational di¤erence per se that makes goods di¤erent, but the missing connection by market transactions. Assumption: For simplicity, from now on we will assume that an individual who can work for …rms s and t and actually works for s changes her job to …rm t after the imposition of the lump sum tax, only if the wage in …rm t is going to be strictly higher than the wage in s.
We then have the following result: Proposition 2: Let (A) be an e¢cient allocation. Then the following 1 The discussion is related to the notion of horizontal product di¤erentiation from standard locational theory (see e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1992) . Goods are said to be horizontally di¤er-entiated if consumers di¤er in demand even if the goods are sold at the same price, like for di¤erent ‡avors of ice cream. These goods would not be homogenous according to the above de…nition. Ice cream with di¤erent ‡avors sold at the same price corresponds to labor supply of di¤erent equalproductivity areas that has the same price in equilibrium by chance. The economic rationale for this conclusion is as follows. In the language of Lancaster's (1966) characteristics model, goods with di¤erent characteristics are di¤erent goods. Characteristics are, however, identi…ed with locational distance together with a strictly monotone transportation-cost function that implies di¤erences in utility net-of-transportation costs for goods with di¤erent distances from the own location.
Hence, goods with di¤erent location but the same distance have the same characteristics from the point of view of the consumer and are therefore homogenous. It is the strict monotonicity of the transportation-cost function that is missing in our model. This implies that the set of spatially di¤erentiated but nevertheless homogenous labor inputs may be larger than in the standard model.
We would like to thank Konrad Stahl who pointed our attention to this similarity. two statements are equivalent.
1. The imposition of any set of tax rates T t¸0 (t = 1; ::; n) such that 9t 1 6 = t 2 with T t 1 6 = T t 2 leads to an ine¢cient allocation. (In words: Any tax di¤erential implies ine¢ciency.) 2. The economy constitutes a region.
The proposition completely characterizes the cases in our model which are qualitatively equivalent to models of unrestricted mobility when it comes to the impact of di¤erential taxation. If and only if an allocation constitutes a region, any di¤erential taxes will be ine¢cient. This result is to a certain degree intuitive but not trivial.
Note that the characterization is based on the quite complex notion of "no binding mobility restriction" as given in de…nition 1. In particular, it is not obvious why there are no other cases beside regions where any di¤erential taxes will be ine¢cient.
By generalizing the 1))2) direction of the proof we get the following corollary that states that in our model it is always possible to equalize wages e¢ciently by …rm speci…c taxes. The idea is quite simple: one can inductively skim o¤ marginal productivity di¤erences between …rms by …rm speci…c taxes without a¤ecting the allocation.
Corollary 1: Let (A) be an e¢cient allocation. Then there is …rm speci…c tax rates T t¸0 (t = 1; ::; n), such that the resulting decentralized equilibrium after the imposition of the taxes is e¢cient and net wages The corollary is based on the assumption of …rm speci…c tax rates and is thus of only very limited empirical relevance. The corollary is still important because it establishes a theoretical benchmark and can be compared to the results in the next section, when more realistic assumptions on the tax code are made.
Di¤erential Wage Taxes in the Two Country Case
In this section we assume that the union is divided into two countries R and Q:
The authorities of the two countries impose country-speci…c wage taxes T R and T Q to be paid by individuals working for …rms located in the respective country. Because we are only interested in the tax di¤erential T R ¡T Q , we can assume that only country R levies a tax, T := T R and T Q := 0. In the next proposition we will characterize when di¤ering tax rates lead to ine¢ciency.
, where we take the minimum over all pairs (s; t) such that …rm s is located in R and …rm t in Q and 9S ½ f1; :::; ng with s; t 2 S and is the minimum productivity di¤erential between two directly connected …rms s 2 R and t 2 Q, such that there exist individuals that could work for t but do work for s: If we impose a higher tax than T 0 , these individuals may have an incentive to change to …rm t: The intuition behind the …rst condition is that if country R's border is uniformly more productive than the border of country Q then the minimum productivity di¤erential can be skimmed o¤ by a tax without a¤ecting the e¢cient allocation.
The second condition is of rather pathological nature. It basically says that if the border region of country R was uniformly less productive before imposition of the tax (in the sense that in the original allocation before taxation each individual that can work for a …rm in R and a …rm in Q works for the …rm in Q) then country R can be punished by a tax without a¤ecting e¢ciency. All the workers in the border region that could possibly quit for a …rm in Q already work for a …rm in Q: The others cannot evade from the tax. If the purpose of the tax is redistribution between "rich" and "poor" we should focus on the …rst condition.
Note how the scope for redistribution hinges on the degree of mobility. If, for example, we are in an environment of unrestricted mobility, then T 0 will be zero. In general, T 0 will gradually increase, if mobility is gradually restricted because binding mobility restrictions may lead to increased di¤erences in marginal productivities.
The complexity of the proof of the proposition shows that the result is far from trivial. It is true that it seems to be quite intuitive that both conditions 1) and 2) do not a¤ect e¢ciency. But note that even this apparently simple part of the proposition includes the non-trivial …rst part of proposition 1 that a decentralized economy is e¢cient. (Take the case where Q is the empty set. Then condition 2
holds. Therefore by proposition 3 the decentralized equilibrium is e¢cient, which is the statement of the …rst part of proposition 1). Furthermore, it is not at all obvious to see the second part of proposition 3. If we are given a tax that does not a¤ect the e¢ciency of the allocation, why then has necessarily one of the conditions 1) or 2) of the proposition to be true?
As pointed out already, for empirical applications the …rst condition in the proposition is the relevant one. It pins down the scope for redistribution without e¢ciency losses of transfer payments between, for example, two countries or two regions in the EU. The co-existence of regions with high and low marginal productivities shows that mobility restrictions must be binding at the border areas of these regions. Wage taxes can be higher in the region with high marginal productivity without distorting the allocation of labor. Inter-jurisdictional transfers that might be legitimized by inter-jurisdictional inequality aversion can be e¢ciently administered by the means of high taxes on high productivity areas.
We will now investigate in more detail -for the special case where the two countries form an equal productivity area -how di¤erent tax rates a¤ect the allocation of labor. The ine¢ciency after imposition of the tax is caused by workers who switch to …rms in country Q that pay higher wages (because wages of …rms in R are subject to the tax) and thereby causing a decrease in the marginal productivities of those …rms. In general, there is no reason why the di¤erent tax rates in the two countries should have an impact on the workforce of all …rms in U: In fact, the explanation for ine¢ciency just given, makes it seem that the e¤ect of the tax is restricted to …rms that are directly connected to …rms of the other countries and that only the workers located in a stripe containing the frontier will change to another …rm. As we will show now, this intuition does not hold in the case where the two countries form an equal productivity area. The tax will a¤ect the amount of workers in all the …rms in U. Reallocation of the workforce spreads from the frontier over the whole country similar to a domino e¤ect.
Proposition 4 (Domino E¤ect): Let U be an equal productivity area.
Introduction of a tax T > 0 in one country leads to a global change in the allocation of labor, i.e. if s is any …rm then after the introduction of the tax, s will employ either strictly more or strictly less workers.
To some extent, proposition 4 can be interpreted in defense of the results of that branch of the literature that assumes free labor mobility, namely that redistribution e¤orts based on di¤erential tax rates necessarily have to imply ine¢ciency. Since, as discussed earlier, this assumption seems to be far too strong for real world applications, the results may seem to be of only modest empirical relevance. However, the proposition provides an example in the context of a model of restricted mobility-a union that forms an equal productivity area-that leads to the equivalent implication that di¤erent tax rates result in an ine¢cient distortion of the workforce.
Place-of-Employment versus Place-of-Residence Principle, Commuting and Migration
In this subsection we will focus on a multi-country setup and assume that each country can levy country speci…c taxes on wages. We will discuss the empirical relevance of our model in the context of di¤erent tax principles and di¤erent types of mobility. We will start by de…ning the relevant concepts:
The two tax principles can be de…ned as follows. If workers pay taxes in the country in which they are employed, we call it a place-of-employment (PoE) principle. If they pay taxes in the country in which they have their residency, we call it a place-of-residence (PoR) principle.
We focus on two di¤erent types of mobility: commuting and migration. The former means that an individual who is a resident in country Q, does not move to country R if she accepts a job in R. She remains a resident of country Q and commutes on a regular (daily, weekly) basis from her home to her place of employment.
The latter concept means that whenever an individual accepts a job in a country she is not resident of, she will move her place of residency to that country. Given the way we use the terms commuting and migration it would be more precise to talk about international commuting and migration.
Throughout the paper we have worked with the PoE principle. It can be argued that this is the prevailing principle in reality, for example in the European Union The phenomenon of international commuting has attracted considerable attention in the discussion about legal prerequisites for e¤ective mobility (see for example regulations 1408/71, 574/72, and 1248/92 of the EU that settle problems of co-ordination in the …eld of social security). However, so far the formal literature on …scal federalism had to say very little about it. On the other hand, our modelunder the PoE principle-is naturally applicable under both forms of mobility. Therefore, whenever we observe the PoE principle, we can use the results of the previous section for labor tax policy advice. Take for example the insights of proposition 4:
Consider a border area between countries with a relatively high population density and a high willingness to commute, such as -in the case of the European Union for example-the border areas of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany, the Spanish/Portuguese border or the German/Austrian border. In these areas, cultural and language barriers are relatively small. Assume the assumptions of the proposition hold, in particular we have the same marginal productivities of …rms along the border line. Assume also we can apply the PoE which -as showed above-is reasonable in the case of the European Union. Then we can conclude that di¤erences in tax rates will lead to an ine¢cient allocation of labor although labor is not unrestrictedly mobile. If migration is small compared to commuting the degree of e¢ciency loss could be reduced by switching from PoE to PoR. We can therefore conclude that even in the case of restricted labor mobility, policy coordination is relevant, particularly in border areas.
We have not dealt with the PoR principle in this paper. Under the PoR principle di¤erent tax rates may have an impact on e¢ciency properties only if migration takes place. Obviously, if there is only commuting and no migration di¤erent PoR tax rates do not distort the labor allocation. If in the context of our model we want to explore the impact of PoR in the case where both commuting and migration are possible, the analysis will become more di¢cult in that each …rm does now have two (or in a multiple country setup multiple) net wages, one for each country of residency of a potential worker. We leave this analysis for future research.
Note that with unrestricted labor mobility, the distinction between the two principles of taxation would parallel the discussion in the literature on capital-tax competition (see Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991) about the di¤erences between the source principle (which parallels the PoE principle for wage taxes) and the residence principle (which parallels the PoR principle).
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has considered a two-dimensional model of labor taxation. The key feature has been a new and quite general approach to partially restricted labor mobility.
We introduce the concept of binding mobility restrictions which represents the driving force for our results. We can summarize our …ndings as follows. 2. We analyze the e¤ects of labor taxation on e¢ciency. We investigate two scenarios of labor taxation and in both setups we give a complete characterization of the cases for which there is scope for redistribution. First, if an authority can impose …rm speci…c taxes, then any tax di¤erential implies ine¢ciency i¤ the economy constitutes a region, i.e. a connected area of equal standard of living with no binding mobility restrictions. Second, in a two country setup with two national tax instruments, the imposition of a tax T on wage income in country R (and zero tax in the other country Q) is e¢cient i¤ essentially T is not higher than the minimum marginal productivity di¤erential of directly connected …rms in R and Q. The …ndings give a basis for interjurisdictional …nancial adjustments between 'rich' and 'poor' countries or regions. In the case of …rm speci…c taxes we show that there always exist e¢cient tax rates T t for each …rm, such that in the resulting decentralized equilibrium net wages are equal.
3. In a two country setup we investigate in more detail the impact of di¤erent tax rates in both countries. If the economic union constitutes an equal productivity area, the tax will have a global e¤ect on the allocation of labor. Every …rm in the economy, not just the ones close to the borderline, will either employ less or more workers after the imposition of the tax.
4. We discuss the empirical relevance and applicability of our model in the context of two tax principles, namely the place-of-employment (PoE) principle and the placeof-residence (PoR) principle and two di¤erent notions of mobility, namely migration and commuting. We …nd that even with restricted mobility, tax policy coordination between countries can be relevant.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Note that since we are given n …rms, K t and µ; we are implicitely given (M S ) and (A S ):W.l.o.g. By choosing an appropriate technology F t for each …rm, we can guarantee that …rm t really has marginal productivity F C. Proof of Proposition 2 1))2) We will show that (not 2)) implies (not 1)). Let (A) be the original e¢cient allocation and assume the economy is not a region. Then i) there are two …rms that cannot be linked by a chain of directly connected …rms or ii) there exist binding mobility restrictions. We want to show that in both cases i), ii) there is a possibility to raise taxes that are not equal for all …rms and that do not a¤ect the e¢ciency of the allocation. For case i) pick two such …rms s and t: Let M be the set of all …rms that can be reached from s by a chain of directly connected …rms. Then there is no S ½ f1; :::; ng with u 2 S \ M; v 2 S \ CM and A S > 0 (by CM we denote the complement of M ). This is saying that there is no individual who could work for a …rm in M and for a …rm in is an e¢cient equilibrium for production functions of the …rms given by
We show by contradiction that (B)is not e¢cient for the original production functions F t .
Claim: There is a …rm v such that F qed.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Let (A) be an e¢cient allocation and let
in be the ordering of the …rms according to their marginal productivities in that allocation. For each …rm s, if s = i t ;
impose the …rm speci…c tax T s := F A0 it ¡ F A0 i1 on …rm s: It is clear that the tax does not a¤ect the allocation and that wages will be equalized after the tax is imposed.
qed.
E. Proof of Proposition 3
1. We start with the ( direction of the proof. We …rst show that condition 1 in the proposition implies e¢ciency.
Let (A) be the allocation of the workforce before the imposition of the tax. The following implica-
[There is …rms s 2 R and t 2 Q such that after the tax is imposed an individual changes her job from s to t] )[There are …rms s 2 R and t 2 Q and 9S ½ f1; :::; ng with s; t 2 S, A
Negating these statements yields: The very last implication follows from the fact that the decentralized equilibrium before imposition of the tax is e¢cient (proposition 1). Therefore if no individual changes her job after imposition of the tax (the only possible changes of jobs after imposing a tax in R are from …rms in R to …rms in Q) the resulting equilibrium with taxes is still e¢cient. We have shown so far that condition 1 of the proposition implies e¢ciency.
If condition 2 of the proposition holds, no individual who could have worked for …rms in R and Q before imposition of the tax, actually worked in R. It is clear that after imposition of the tax in R, there is no reason why such an individual should now start working for a …rm in R. Therefore, the same reasoning as before implies e¢ciency.
) direction of the proof:
Let (A) be the allocation before imposition of the tax and (B) the decentralized equilibrium after the tax. Assume that both conditions 1) and 2) of the proposition do not hold. We want to show that (B) is ine¢cient. We will reason by contradiction The proof consists of …rst showing that e¢ciency of (B) implies the following two statements i) and ii).
Assume that (B) is e¢cient. Then: i) Let s be a …rm with strictly bigger marginal productivity in (B) than in (A) and let t be a …rm that employs a nonzero mass of workers in (B) that in the allocation (A) worked for s. Then t's marginal productivity in (B) must also be bigger than in (A). ii) It is true that (9t 2 Q F (B) is a decentralized equilibrium when workers at …rm t gain wages F 0 t (x) ¡ 1(t 2 R) ¢ T (x being the mass of workers working for …rm t). By proposition 1, (B) is then also an e¢cient equilibrium, if the production functions of the …rms are given by G t (x) := F t (x) ¡ 1(t 2 R) ¢ T ¢ x: By equation ; …rm s 2 R lost some workers (we do not claim that it is a net loss in the total workforce of …rm s). In (B) these workers must be employed at a …rm in Q (if not, they must be employed at a …rm s 0 2 R: Thus, 9s 0 2 R; S ½ f1; :::; ng; s; s 0 ; t 2 S; s , contradiction). The last statements combined yield that, net, a strictly positive mass of workers changes form …rms in R to …rms in Q: Thus, for some s 2 R we have F A0 s < F B0 s , which contradicts (*).
F. Proof of Proposition 4
We know from proposition 2 that both the sets H = fs 2 f1; :::; ng; F before the tax to the allocation (B) after the tax there is 1) a positive net stream of workers (pns) from the …rms in E to the ones in H and a negative net stream (nns) from E to L 2) nns from E to H and pns from E to L 3) there is a zero net stream of workers between E and H and between E and L: Case 1) and 3) both imply that there is a pns from H to L. This implies that there exist s 2 H and t 2 L and 9S ½ f1; :::; ng s; t 2 S, B qed.
